There is no particular protection against a religious offense in the French Law 1 , even though respect for religious beliefs has its place in the French Constitution. The right to be respected for ones religious beliefs is indeed linked to the freedom of conscience, deriving directly from article 10 of the 1789 French Declaration of Rights (Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen), according to the French Constitutional Council 2 (Conseil Constitutionnel). Respect for religious beliefs is also linked to article 1 of the French Constitution, which defines the French Republic as secular (laïque) and requires that "all beliefs" be respected. Of course this respect is well insured for protecting freedom of faith in relation to individual and collective freedom of religious expression, but if becomes quite inexistent if we attempt to include, as logical, the protection against a religious offense.
1. The first is that religious beliefs are respected as one of the forms of French "freedom" of opinion. Yet, the French Declaration of Rights doesn't make a distinction between categories of opinion in its article 10, as the European Convention on Human Rights does, with its two separate articles, one on freedom of thought, conscience and religion (article 9) and the other on the freedom of expression including "the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authorities and regardless of frontiers" (article 10).
It is therefore the freedom of opinion, "including religious views," that the French Declaration protects. Article 1 of the present Constitution (1958) , on the "respect of all beliefs," is an undetermined quantitative article in that it doesn't qualify the term "belief." There's a fundamental and voluntary lack of precision between the notions of opinion and belief, between the nature of opinion and belief and between faith and conscience. All in all, in the different texts on the protection of Civil liberties, we find a general trilogy of "political, religious and trade union" opinions. But there is no distinction between religious beliefs and other beliefs. Freedom of opinion protects all beliefs and ordinary guarantees in general. It is not possible to find a hierarchy between an ordinary freedom of opinion and an "extraordinary" one, based on article 10 of the 1789 Declaration of Rights, even when combined with article 1 of the 1958 Constitution on the respect for all beliefs. 1 For an overview on the question, between 1980 to 2000, see B. Beigner", L'Honneur et le Droit ", LGDJ, 1995, pp. 330-337 , Emmanuel Derieux, « Diffamations, injures et convictions en procès. Etat de la jurisprudence nationale », Annuaire Droit et religions, 2005, PUAM, pp. 105-126, Pascal Mbongo, « Le traitement juridictionnel des offenses aux convictions religieuses », in Mélanges en l 'honneur de Jean-François Lachaume, Paris, Dalloz, 2007, pp. 691-708 . 2 The freedom of conscience derives from France's Declaration of the Rights, article 10: "No one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, including his religious views, provided their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law". In a first step, the Constitutional Council seemed to dissociate this freedom from this article, defining it as a « fundamental principle recognized by the laws of the Republic » (Decision n° 77-87 DC, November 23 1977, related Consequently, no right for (legal) recourse against criticism of religions or intimate beliefs exists either, even when of the most "blasphemous" nature; freedom of opinion, renders all opinions, even anti-religious ones, perfectly free. Intimate convictions are treated equally with any form of beliefs or opinions. Making ones owns convictions public and carrying them onto the public scene necessarily exposes the believer to various but legitimate reactions in the framework of democratic pluralism. The believer or man of conviction cannot expect to be protected in his convictions. This sort of logic turns out to be close to the Handyside judgement, rendered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR): Freedom of expression implies the risk that information or opinions can "offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population."
6 According to the ECHR, this freedom also constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society. And, combined with democratic principles of equality and pluralism, it doesn't push to invoke, in order to protect the offended religious conviction, any opinion that would attack the aforesaid conviction. "We cannot imagine a case, where freedom of expression is at stake, which is not initiated by speeches judged shocking, afflictive, troubling or disturbing toward one or several individuals, or toward one or several public authorities. We cannot imagine the debate of ideas, including those about religion, without a confrontation between the protagonists who wish it" 7 .
Nevertheless, we will see how constitutional indifference vis-a-vis "religion" has highly advantaged freedom of expression in France, when it "attacks" religion. In the second section we will present the limits that nevertheless exist on freely expressing anti-religious views due to general legal constraints that weigh on freedom of expression and equally due to the more sustaining comprehension of the notion of pluralism, recently considered as constitutional value according to the French Constitutional Council. The respect of pluralism is slowly gaining the legal context, especially the mediatic one and permits new perspectives on the subject.
In this paper it is argued that contrary to popular belief the two rights, though very much interdependent, do not in abstracto 'clash'. Moreover, with the view of optimally guaranteeing human rights law in actual practice, the two rights do, as a rule, not need to be balanced --for it is precisely when the two rights are balanced without a legal necessity to do so that human rights law is undermined. The broader intent of this article is to present a human rights based assessment of blasphemy prohibitions and counter-defamation (of And the Israelite woman's son and a man of Israel fought in the camp, and the Israelite woman's son blasphemed the Name, and cursed. Then they brought him to Moses. His mother's name was Shelomith, the daughter of Dibri, of the tribe of Dan. And they put him in custody, till the will of the LORD should be clear to them. Then the LORD spoke to Moses, saying, "Bring out of the camp the one who cursed, and let all who heard him lay their hands on his head, and let all the congregation stone him. And speak to the people of Israel, saying, Whoever curses his God shall bear his sin. Whoever blasphemes the name of the LORD shall surely be put to death. All the congregation shall stone him. The sojourner as well as the native, when he blasphemes the Name, shall be put to death …" So Moses spoke to the people of Israel, and they brought out of the camp the one who had cursed and stoned him with stones. Thus the people of Israel did as the LORD commanded Moses." The New Testament speaks of earthly punishments as well as possible repercussions in the afterlife, yet solely with regard to blasphemy against the Holy Spirit: HOLY BIBLE (English Standard Version), Matthew 12: 30-32: "Whoever is not with me is against me, and whoever does not gather with me scatters. Therefore I tell you, every sin and blasphemy will be forgiven people, but the blasphemy against the Spirit will not be forgiven. And whoever speaks a word against the Son of Man will be forgiven, but whoever speaks against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven, either in this age or in the age to come." See also Mark 3: 28-29: "Truly, I say to you, all sins will be forgiven the children of man, and whatever blasphemies they utter, but whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit never has forgiveness, but is guilty of an eternal sin". The Quran speaks of earthly punishments as well as possible repercussions in the afterlife: THE HOLY QUR'AN (tranl. Abdullah Yusuf Ali), 9:74: "They swear by Allah that they said nothing (evil), but indeed they uttered blasphemy, and they did it after accepting Islam; and they meditated a plot which they were unable to carry out: this revenge of theirs was (their) only return for the bounty with which Allah and His Messenger had enriched them! If they repent, it will be best for them; but if they turn back (to their evil ways), Allah will punish them with a grievous penalty in this life and in the Hereafter: They shall have none on earth to protect or help them." Other Quranic references to blasphemy (including references that render Christian or Jewish doctrine blasphemous deviations from true doctrine) include: 2:88; 4: 155; 5:17; 5:64; 5:68; 5:73; 6:19; 9:74; 11:9; 14:28; and: 39:8. 9 Art. 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 Dec. 1966 This paper will firstly endeavour to identify and analyse domestic approaches to dealing with blasphemy and defamation of religion (paragraph A). Subsequently, UN human rights law, policy and practice on the issue of blasphemy/defamation will be elaborated upon, with a special focus on the emerging 'Counter-Defamation Discourse' (paragraph B), 11 before moving on to an analysis of the manner in which the regional European Court of Human Rights has dealt so far with the issue of blasphemy and defamation of religions (paragraph C).
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It is concluded (paragraph D) that the emerging 'Counter-Defamation Discourse' is unacceptable because it:
(i) seeks to shift the emphasis from protection of the rights of individuals to protection of religions per se; (ii) introduces grounds for limitation of human rights, particularly of the right to freedom of expression, that are not recognized by international human rights law (e.g. respect for religions, respect for people's religious feelings); (iii) and seeks to reformulate the right to freedom of religion or belief so as to include a right to have one's religious feelings respected. It is contended that rather than focussing on strategies to counter defamation of religions, we should concentrate on and deal with practices that threaten individual human rights; that is to say, we should more effectively tackle the issue of advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. Sept. 1970 , 20 Dec. 1971 , 1 Jan. 1990 , and 1 Nov. 1998 respectively) would be well-advised: "Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.
Roberta Aluffi Beck-Peccoz Abstract
Proselytism is the attempt to persuade other people to accept your religious beliefs, and consequently to change their religion. The freedom to change one's religion, as an essential aspect of the freedom of religion, has always been strongly opposed by Islamic States. Consistently, they do not favour proselytism; they tend to restrict it even in its lightest forms, such as the simple expression of one's intimate beliefs.
This peculiar conception of the freedom of religion could be described as static, as opposed to the more dynamic original international conception (UDHR, art. 18). But a closer examination, through the lenses of Arabic legal vocabulary forged by Muslim scholars, reveals the deeper character of this conception and the actual, ambiguous attitude of Islamic States towards proselytism and conversion. There is neither a general term meaning "conversion", nor "proselytism". The conversion of a Muslim to another religion is singled out as ridda, apostasy. Ridda is forbidden; on the contrary, other types of conversion are either of no relevance or welcomed (as for the case of the conversion to Islam). Da c wa means the call to Islam, the Islamic proselytism. The term can not properly apply to other kinds of proselytism. Da c wa is normally supported by the Islamic States. Other kinds of proselytism are tolerated, on the condition that they do not target Muslims. If they do so, they are prohibited.
The conception of the freedom of religion defended by Islamic States is intrinsically not egalitarian. It does not apply to every religion or to every believer in the same way. The legal vocabulary itself makes it impossible to speak of the different religions on an equal footing, thinking in the same terms of the freedom of all citizens, Muslims and non Muslims. In those countries, statehood is intimately linked to the Islamic religious tradition. Political membership almost coincides with religious membership. Proselytism is not restricted because of its interference with the right of individuals to be let alone, but rather because it is perceived as a major threat to the coherence and cohesion of the nation/umma : it can lead to ridda, the paradigm of political treason.
The analysis of the provisions governing proselytism in a number of Islamic States, such as Algeria, Morocco and Pakistan, will shed light on the ambiguities which stem from the persistence of Islamic legal categories beneath the international discourse on the freedom of religion.
In 1992 Israel enacted two "Basic Laws", considered to be quasi-constitution, which was followed by a "Constitutional Revolution" that entrenched the various Human Rights in all levels of the Israeli legal system. In both laws, there is a duty to implement all Human Rights according to "the values of a Jewish and Democratic State".
The problem is, however, that in many cases there is a contradiction between these values. For instance, according to Jewish Law it is prohibited for a person to change his religion and be converted to another religion.
In modern legal systems, this notion is unacceptable, since it contradicts the basic principles of democracy, such as Freedom in general, and Freedom of Speech and Thought and Freedom of Religion, in particular. Moreover: not only does Jewish Law prohibit any kind of proselytism or conversion to other religions, but according to the Israeli Penal Code, enticement of a person to change his/her religion (for example. by the Christian Mission) is a criminal offence.
The presentation will try to explain the background -historical, sociological and legal -to the special Israely legal arrangement regarding the prohibition on free Proselytism, and to examine how such prohibition can co-exist with the basic principal of Freedom of Religion in a Democracy, and what are the reflections of this issue on the broad tension between Jewish Values and Democratic values as they have been reflected in the Israeli legal system in the past and in modern times.
Religious Symbols in Public Institutions

Religious symbols: a comparison between the United States and Italian experience
Adelaide Madera Abstract In Western democracies the issue of religious symbols is nowadays the testing ground of the difficult balance between the principle of state secularism and religious freedom. The emergence of this problem in the European Union is connected with the increasing Muslim immigration, but also in the United States, where there is an established religious pluralism, the acceptance of religious minorities is not always without problems. In the U.S.A., as in European countries, adhesion to a secular state model implies exclusion of religion from the public field, and its containment in the private ambit. This trend is emphasized by the self assertion of new religious groups: the need for their integration in the U.S.A., as in other juridical systems which qualify themselves as secular, requires the identification of the most suitable means to respond to the demands of religious pluralism. All this means an evolution of the very idea of secularism. The benevolent secularism towards some religious confessions is changing into stricter criteria of neutrality (U.S.A., Italy); for these reasons a national identity connected with the symbols of Jewish-Christian tradition is no longer understandable. Jurisprudence testifies that the interaction of Church-State relationships is being increasingly played on the field of the legitimacy of the forms of religious message diffusion, with the apparent state cooperation. Such cooperation, when it happens, seems to damage increasingly the need of new religious groups to participate in an effective pluralism. In this framework, the American experience testifies both how in a pluralistic society the members of a religious confession may be subject to restrictions connected with their faith and the laws generally in force have a variable impact on religious citizens, imposing burdens because of their religious choices. We wonder whether either a State has to adopt an attitude of strict neutrality towards demands about religious freedom, creating that impenetrable wall of separation, which seems required by the strictest interpretations of the establishment clause, or a public action oriented to remove the burdens connected to the exercise of religious freedom (guaranteeing a reasonable accommodation of it) is acceptable, in which measure it is, and which are the most suitable instruments. In a juridical context where every form of state endorsement of religion is forbidden, debate about religious symbols remains living and present, when it is connected with a claim both of the individual (active symbol) and of a more or less large community (passive symbol) in order to express their own religious identity either in public or in a place open to the public. In the U.S.A. the Supreme Court is charged both with the definition of the "variable geometry" of religious freedom and its limits and with the duty to realize this difficult balance; the maintenance of this balance prevents the explosion of political divisiveness for religious reasons from time to time and maintains that coherence which permits all citizens to feel themselves full members of the political community, whatever race, gender, ethnic group and religion they belong to. It is however an acquired awareness that the choice of religious accommodation is more difficult to pursue than an aseptic formal neutrality. The benefit of the comparison with the American model is clear, as nowadays scholars of ecclesiastical law swing between different interpretations of the principle of secularism: sometimes they hope for the acceptance of a strict religious neutrality (as in the French model) sometimes they tend in the direction of a secularism consistent with special forms of recognition of democratically tolerable religious peculiarities. Within this framework the question of religious symbols is a catalytic element of greater problems, involving the identification of a model of a politically correct secularism, which guarantees the satisfaction of both individual and collective religious demands while still respecting constitutional values. The verifying of the correct measure of state legislative intervention in a pluralistic society, without causing obstacles or prejudices to the development of the free market of religions is essential. In the light of the comparison of different models of Church-State relationships and their costs/benefits impact on both individual and collective religious freedom, a juridical system can pursue the aim to reach equality as a generalized extension of an equally favourable treatment to all religious groups, protecting their specific identities, rather than as an elimination of every regime of favour and as a realization of a model of formal neutrality. The problem of religious symbols is an incentive to evaluate future methodological choices of the legislator about the protection of religion in an age of the globalization of rights, by making a comparison with different normative experiences: a widespread ecclesiastical law, regulated only by civil law and entrusted to the self-managed production of private people involved, with the (formal) technical support of professional jurists (by means of conventions, contracts, codes of behaviour, confirmed by administrative or judicial provisions) or rather ( more coherently with the principle of equal liberty) an ecclesiastical law full of concrete contents (not through private conventions) but through democratically and secularly enforced laws subject to a control of constitutional compatibility.
Civil Religion in the Framework of Religious Symbols in Public Institutions
Elena Miroshnikova Abstract 1. Religion is one of the disputed legacies of human history. Private belief and public belief often conflict. How can a political regime harmoniously accommodate a range of private religious weltanschauungs into a structure of public belief that has been shaped by time and tradition? What are the place and the role of religious symbols in relations between states and religious communities? Why and for what reasons? Do existing relations promote societal harmony or do they disintegrate the peace? What corrections, if any, should be made with reference to existing public religious symbols? Are public religious symbols good for the national and cultural identities of the state ? Answers to such questions do not come easily.
2. The phenomenon of secularization further complicates the picture. Is it possible now to say that secularization has achieved its goals and religion is now outside the public domain? Is religion now only the private thing of the person? The evolution of the world after the Enlightenment tends toward this conclusion, at least in some parts of the world. From one side, of course, the influence of secularization is very strong. In Continental Europe, from which Christian evangelization began, it is proper to speak of the need for "reevangelisation" (Pope Benedict XXIV). From the other side, the exodus from the churches does not necessarily imply a break from belief of any kind. Among European adults, about 70% still say they are religious (this figure parallels Russia). On the strength of figures like these, some might say that we are witnessing a process of desecularization. I disagree. Once born, secularization is not likely to diminish; the change in the issue of religion becomes a reality. Religious symbols might be a way of accommodating religion in a secularized world.
3. Globalization changes things too. Cultural and national particularities are melting away, so to say. Religion in this situation becomes the new status; it becomes a sign of national and cultural identity, a sign for the main population as much as for immigrants. Religious symbols in public institutions might be a way of acknowledging the reality of globalization. The conflicts between Islam and Christianity in the context of the use of religious symbols in public institutions show the practical difficulties in accommodating a range of private religious weltanschauungungs into a structure of public belief.
4. In recent times the engagement of religious bodies in the body politic has grown to cover a wide range of issues, including the economic and social dimensions. E.g., the discussion about religious instruction in public schools is evidence of how much religion has become politicized. In the main, it is impossible to put religion outside of public life. The phenomenon of civil religion is an expression of a friendly state-church relationship and is a via media between separation and identification, between recognizing religion as a private right and as an institutional form. We are witnesses today of new forms of public religion. Hegel's dialectic--thesis, antithesis, synthesis--applies here.
In this context I understand religion as thesis, secularization as antithesis, and the civil religion as synthesis (religion-secularization-civil religion).
5. Civil religion, as already suggested, might be part of the answer.
Civil religion is generalized public belief that accommodates within its belief structure as many religious and nonreligious weltanschauungs as possible. It is a form of connection between religion and politics. But is it a revival or rejection of traditional religions? Perhaps both. Civil religion might be basic to the realization of the state's neutrality, to guarantee the equality of religions or beliefs of the citizens. Moreover, civil religion might be a way of accommodating religion in a secularized world. It might also be a way of acknowledging the reality of globalization.
6. Civil religion in the framework of religious symbols in public institutions in the Russian context might be a revival of older religious ideas, or it might be a rejection of older religious ideas. It might be a little of both, but whatever it is, I hope it will be fundamentally a tool to unite the nation, to give a moral ground for government policy and for embracing religious pluralism. Russia's religious tradition (state identification with Russian Orthodoxy) was broken during the Soviet period. A form of separation appeared during the Soviet era, but it was a hostile separation of religion from national life rather than a friendly separation of religion from state activity. Soviet policy marginalized religion; it did not embrace it.
Thus, in today's world, which is so strongly marked by diversity of belief, Russia has no broad tradition of religious pluralism. Civil religion is an innovative idea in the post-Soviet world that could aid Russian in embracing religious pluralism.
Conclusion:
The new Russia must find a way for religion and democracy to be mutually supportive. Civil religion might be of help in this respect, enabling Russia to embrace freedom of conscience in a polyconfessional state while also refusing to embrace religious nationalism under the motto of patriotism.
Religious Symbols and the Fragmentation of Freedom of Religion or Belief through Freedom of Manifestation Peter Petkoff
To what extent the treatment of religious symbols as other belief symbols (civic, other competing political models) through the lens of freedom of expression/manifestation marks a departure from treating religious symbols in the context of freedom of religion or belief? Methodology This is a comparative study of a sample of national and international cases against the background of legal and political theory with a focus on religious symbols. Abstract The theme of external confrontation dominates the legal and political discourses on religious symbols which are frequently presented as a manifestation of an opposition to political symbols and constitutional principles. Religious symbols are often interpreted as something 'other than' civic symbols, something which dilutes civic symbols, misguides away from them and is therefore a kind of a civic subversion, a civic anomaly. By revisiting a number of 'religious symbols' land mark cases the paper examines the extent to which the adopted 'symbols' language and the chosen line of enquiry dominated by 'manifestation focus' have developed a legal discourse grounded primarily in the context of constitutional provisions and constitutional exceptions. This approach has evolved historically into a departure from interpreting religious symbols through the lens of freedom of religion or belief. The occasional cases where freedom of religion or belief has dominated the discourse religious symbols have been reduced to forum externum. Recent studies of current religious freedom jurisprudence have already highlighted the limitations of the public/private divide with regards to religious freedom claims and the need for religious freedom cases to be interpreted through a multivectored approach which takes into account the complex and often indivisible relationship between forum internum and forum externum on a case by case basis. The fluidity of this approach has as its starting point protection of freedom of religion or belief through the lens of human rights seen as legal tools rather than as an ethical code. Applied to religious symbols this approach confronts head-on the obvious problem of religious symbols' jurisprudence -that religious symbols are not necessarily seen as part of the complex life of the concept of freedom of religion or belief, but as an exterior which could and should be isolated from the core concept. Historically the legal discourse in relation to religious symbols has been focused on the exterior representation of religious belief. The 'semantic sting' to use Dworkin's term of this approach is that the term 'symbol' in different contexts has colliding connotations. While symbol sometimes refers to a visual association, in a religious context the term 'symbol' signifies the totality of a life choices, an existential pattern in its full complexity within which a notion of interior or exterior cannot be isolated. In this way a vague linguistic reference to a graphical representation could also mean life, way, truth and deeper meaning. In this context this paper also attempts to explore the anatomy of emergence of religious symbols discourse, its roots, legal and political theory in the background of such discourse and the reasons why particular types of religious symbols receive higher visibility compared to others. The author examines the ways courts handle religious symbols claims and highlights the differences between more systemic approaches and more practical case by case oriented approaches. One of the most significant features of such jurisprudence is the courts' uncertainty whether religious symbols should be approached via the route manifestation and freedom of expression and in isolation from freedom of religion or belief or primarily through the lens of freedom of religion or belief. The paper explores hermeneutic strategies which are likely to move religious symbols' discourse beyond expression and manifestation and beyond the notion that and religious symbols just as certain political symbols are reduced to those which challenge a constitutional order and those which do not. Possible future strategies:
• Case by case human rights' hermeneutic strategies with an emphasis on freedom of religion or belief • Proportionality and 'individual belief history' (a concept P Edge has convincingly borrowed from criminal law and applied in respect to freedom of religion or belief) manifestation of religious symbols in public institutions to a selection of relevant case law of the Canadian Supreme Court and the South African Constitutional Court.
The relevance of such a comparison may be illustrated by the case of Multani which was decided by the Canadian S.C. more or less simultaneously with the Leyla Şahin case. Multani dealt with the decision of a school board not to allow a Sikh student to wear a metal kirpan (dagger) in school. The court unanimously found the ban to be a violation of the freedom of religion because it was disproportionate and would 'stifle the promotion of values such as multiculturalism, diversity, and the development of an educational culture respectful of the rights of others'. Cass Sunstein, professor of jurisprudence at the University of Chicago, argues that such striking differences in judicial outcome are caused by different theories of interpretation to which judges adhere. Sunstein himself proposes 'incompletely theorized agreements' and 'minimalist' interpretation as most suited for pluralistic, democratic societies, as it should be 'possible for people to agree, when agreement is necessary, and unnecessary for people to agree, when agreement is impossible'. In the proposed paper we shall measure the case law of the ECtHR, the Canadian Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court of South Africa against the standards of minimalism and incompletely theorized agreements. According to Aagje Ieven, writing in the slightly different context of privacy rights in the ECtHR, 'both the features of the Court's jurisprudence and the reasons the Court offers for its decisions fit in with Sunstein's minimalism'. Yet, when we compare Şahin to Multani one might argue that the Canadian court approached its case in a much more minimalist fashion. By comparing the case law of the three high courts and the interpretation theories used, we will investigate whether any interpretation theory and minimalism in particular is to be favored as the approach by judges towards the manifestation of religious symbols in public institutions and whether this would lead to the maximum protection of the freedom of religion.
